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It has long been argued that the legalization of same-sex marriage would have a
negative impact on marriage. My dissertation examines what happened to different-
sex marriage in the Netherlands after the enactment of two laws: in 1998, a law that
provided all couples with an institution almost identical to marriage—registered
partnership, and in 2001, a law that legalized same-sex marriage for the first time
in the world. The first chapter provides a brief description of the same-sex marriage
debate and of the legal background in the Netherlands. In the second chapter, I
analyze the marriage decision at the individual level. I construct a unique data set
covering the period 1995–2005 by matching individuals from the Dutch Labor Force
Survey with their marriage and residence history from official records. I estimate
the first-marriage decision using a discrete-time hazard model with unobserved het-
erogeneity and I find that the marriage rate rose after the registered partnership law
but fell after the same-sex marriage law.
In the third chapter, I study the evolution of the marriage rate in the aggregate.
I construct a synthetic control for the Netherlands as a weighted average of OECD
member countries over the period 1988–2005. A comparison of the marriage rates in
the Netherlands and the synthetic control confirms the findings from the individual-
level analysis: the different-sex marriage rate rose after the registered partnership
law and then fell after the same-sex marriage law. I also conduct a placebo test
that supports the validity of the results. Finally, I examine the evolution of the
different-sex union (marriages and registered partnerships) rate and I find that the
different-sex union rate returns to its long-term trend after the same-sex marriage
law.
My results could be explained by the combination of two effects. First, couples
may learn over time about registered partnership and gradually switch from marriage
to the new institution. Second, the same-sex marriage law may have caused some
couples to turn away from marriage.
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1.1 The same-sex marriage debate and the end-of-marriage argument
Economists have long been interested in the effects of various policies on in-
dividuals’ decision to marry. Some of the policies studied are aimed directly at the
institution of marriage, such as no-fault divorce laws (Allen et al., 2006; Rasul, 2006)
or minimum age requirements (Blank et al., 2007). Other policies alter monetary
incentives associated with marriage, such as welfare reform (Bitler et al., 2004), or
reduce the cost of premarital sex arising from a reduction in the legal age for use
of oral contraceptives (Goldin and Katz, 2002). The common theme in all these
studies is that the policies each alter the value of marriage relative to alternative
arrangements.
It has been argued recently that another policy that could affect the value
of marriage and implicitly the incentives to marry, particularly for heterosexual
couples, is the legalization of same-sex marriage. The “end-of-marriage argument”
holds that opening marriage to same-sex couples would lead to a fall in the number
of different-sex marriages because the value of marriage would be reduced: “It
demeans the institution. [...] The institution of marriage is trivialized by same-
sex marriage.” (Rep. Henry Hyde, U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee
meeting, as cited in Mohr, 1997) This argument has been mentioned frequently in
1
the same-sex marriage debate, both in the media and in the political discourse,
and was used to justify amendments to state constitutions such as Proposition 8
in California, or the Defense of Marriage Acts, laws meant to protect the federal
or state governments from having to recognize a (same-sex) marriage performed
elsewhere.1
To understand the logic behind the end-of-marriage argument, consider the fol-
lowing analogy. Country clubs establish a certain privileged status for their members
and usually reserve the right to deny membership to persons they deem “unaccept-
able.”2 Now suppose the state enacts a law that forbids country clubs to discriminate
against admissions in any way and effectively allow anybody who desires so to be
a member. In this case, some individuals who were considering becoming members
before the enactment of the law in order to gain the privileged status might choose
not to apply anymore, since there is no privileged status—the value of membership
was reduced for these individuals. A similar effect could be observed if the state
were to create a “competing” country club, which would offer the same benefits as
the private country club, but which would be open to everybody.
However, it is theoretically ambiguous whether same-sex marriage should have
a negative effect on heterosexual marriage. For example, the legalization of same-
sex marriage could be perceived as a move toward a more secular, less traditional
1By the end of 2008, Congress and forty states had enacted such acts (Stateline.org, 2009).
Thirty states also had constitutional amendments that specifically defined marriage as the union
between a man and a woman.
2A case that made the headlines was the refusal of membership by the Kansas City (Mo.)
Country Club to Henry Bloch, chairman and co-founder of H&R Block Inc., because he was a Jew.
This led to the withdrawal of professional golfer Tom Watson from the club (New York Times,
1990).
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institution, increasing its value for some different-sex couples.3 The final effect on
the number of marriages for different-sex couples would then depend on which effect
dominates: the decline in the value of marriage for some couples or the increase in
the value of marriage for some other couples.
This dissertation constitutes the first analysis of the effects that same-sex
marriage has on heterosexual marriage by studying its effect in the Netherlands.
The Netherlands is a good candidate for such an analysis for three reasons. First,
it was the earliest (2001) country to allow same-sex couples to marry, thus offering
the longest period with which to examine the impact of this law.
Second, prior to legalizing same-sex marriage, the Dutch legislature formalized
in 1998 the legal concept of registered partnership, an institution that is identical to
marriage in almost every respect but name and tradition. Unlike in the Nordic coun-
tries, the Dutch registered partnership is also open to different-sex couples. Since
this contract is virtually identical to marriage, this offers a unique opportunity to
distinguish between a change in the marriage rate itself and a change in the number
of couples who wish to legally formalize their relationship. It also allows for the
distinction between the effects of granting same-sex couples the rights and benefits
of marriage through an alternative institution and the effects of same-sex marriage
itself. The short period of time between the two laws, however, also presents the
challenge of distinguishing between the long-term effects of the registered partner-
3In a survey of Dutch couples married or in alternative institutions ran after the legalization
of same-sex marriage, Boele-Woelki et al. (2006) found that almost the same fraction of married
and unmarried couples pointed to the traditional value of marriage as a reason for their choice
of union form. This suggests that some couples preefer marriage because of its traditional value,
while other couples dislike it for the same reason.
3
ship law and the effects of the legalization of same-sex marriage.
Finally, the same-sex marriage debate in the Netherlands was also subject to a
vigorous end-of-marriage argument. Boris Dittrich, former member and floor leader
of the Dutch Parliament and a supporter of the same-sex marriage bill, reports the
following episode: “I distinctly remember my former colleague, Kees van der Staaij
from the Orthodox Christian Party SGP, using those arguments. He even said that
God would punish those who are destroying the institution of marriage between
a man and a woman. [...] That night of the debate (we were debating same-sex
marriage for two full days) I drove home very carefully. I thought: if I will get into
a car accident tonight, people will think God has punished me.”4
1.2 The Dutch legal environment
The road to same-sex marriage in the Netherlands was long and bumpy.5 At
the beginning of the 1990s, gay rights organizations in the Netherlands tried to
build on the success of their Danish counterparts, who had obtained the enactment
of a registered partnership law in 1989, and push for the legal recognition of same-
sex couples. The first move was to suggest in 1991 the creation of a symbolic
registry for same-sex couples, which could have evolved into an alternative to the
marriage registry and to which municipalities would participate voluntarily. Under
this arrangement, same-sex couples were allowed to register their relationship with
the municipality, a registration that did not involve any benefits or obligations from
4Translation of a previous statement (de Verdieping Trouw, 2005) provided during personal
conversation.
5The presentation in this section draws extensively on van Velde (2005) and Merin (2002).
4
either the couple or the municipality or the Dutch government. This suggestion
was not in conflict with the general feelings of the population, as opinion polls
showed that almost 53% of the population supported same-sex marriage in 1990, a
share that increased over time to around 63% in 1991 to about 73% in 1995 (van
Velde, 2005). More than 100 of the 650 Dutch municipalities voluntarily decided
to participate within the first year, thus paving the way for the introduction of the
registered partnership system.
The government was to set up a committee of legal advisers (the Kortmann
Committee) to inquire into the legal effects and the desirability of the legal recog-
nition of same-sex couples. The committee recommended the introduction of a
Danish-style partnership, a proposal warmly received by the government. A bill for
the new institution was introduced in the Parliament in 1993, but held up because
of the 1994 elections. After the elections, the governing coalition in the Netherlands
did not include the Christian Democrats, the largest party opposing same-sex mar-
riage, for the first time in almost eighty years. In 1995, the new cabinet presented a
white paper that suggested the introduction of registered partnerships for same-sex
couples and, in a departure from the Danish model, for different-sex couples as well.
The argument was that the new institution was not supposed to discriminate based
on sexual orientation and that heterosexuals not willing to marry should have access
to this alternative contract (Merin, 2002).
Therefore, the registered partnership was designed to be almost identical to
marriage and, in the case of different-sex couples, an almost perfect substitute.
Waaldijk (2004) compares the two institutions based on their “levels of legal conse-
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quences” (the rights and obligations derived from a contract) and finds only three
differences for heterosexual couples. First, a married man is automatically acknowl-
edged as the father of a child born in that marriage, whereas a man in a registered
partnership has to explicitly claim the child before or after birth (although this is
rather a formality). Second, both contracts can be terminated in court, but regis-
tered partnerships can also be dissolved at the civil registry by mutual agreement.6
Finally, couples in registered partnerships are prohibited from engaging in interna-
tional adoption. This restriction can be circumvented by one partner adopting the
child as a single individual and the other partner subsequently adopting the child
as the partner of the adoptive parent.
Since the planned legislation granted same-sex couples access only to registered
partnerships, there was an argument that same-sex couples would still face discrim-
ination. A motion calling for the opening of civil marriage to same-sex couples
was introduced in 1996, when the white paper was presented as a bill in the Dutch
Parliament. While the registered partnership bill was making its way through the
Parliament’s two chambers, the government acknowledged the request to open up
marriage and appointed a new panel of experts (the second Kortmann Committee)
to analyze the desirability and consequences of same-sex marriage. In the meantime,
the registered partnership bill was approved and signed into law, becoming effective
on January 1, 1998.
6Starting from 2001, married couples can change their marriage to a registered partnership.
Statistics Netherlands reports that, in more than 90% of the cases, this is part of a two-step pro-
cedure commonly called “flash divorce”, where the partnership is dissolved by mutual agreement.
This is a cheaper alternative to divorce when there is an understanding with respect to the division
of common property. Therefore, the rest of the analysis will only include new partnerships rather
than the total number of partnerships.
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The report of the Kortmann Committee, released in October 1997, recom-
mended the legalization of same-sex marriage while dismissing the arguments against
it. In particular, it addressed the issue of a possibly negative effect on heterosexual
marriage: “The argument that a large part of the population would no longer be able
to identify with marriage if it were opened up, applies to an ever diminishing part of
society. They can continue to identify with a marriage in church.” (Kortmann Com-
mittee report, as quoted in van Velde, 2005) Still, the government opposed opening
up marriage to same-sex couples in its February 1998 answer, which prompted an-
other request in the second chamber of the Parliament for new legislation to allow
same-sex couples to marry. The 1998 elections allowed the same coalition to remain
in power, and the ensuing negotiations for the formation of a new cabinet led to an
agreement for the introduction of same-sex marriage during that term. Finally, in
2000, the bill legalizing same-sex marriage was introduced in the Parliament and
was approved in September by the House of Representatives and in December by the
Senate (Merin, 2002). On April 1, 2001, the Netherlands became the first country in
the world to allow same-sex couples to marry, granting them access to an institution
that was traditionally available only to different-sex couples.
In conclusion, the road to the opening of marriage was long and uncertain.
There was no sudden overhaul of the marriage law, but rather a series of small
changes: starting from 1998, both same-sex and different-sex couples could form
registered partnerships. From 2001, same-sex couples are allowed to enter marriage.
Some scholars argue that the success of the gay rights movement in the Netherlands
was actually due to this small-steps approach (Waaldijk, 2001). For the purpose of
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this paper, however, the fact that there was uncertainty with respect to the timing
of the laws allows for an interpretation of them as “exogenous”. Individuals could
not anticipate perfectly the enaction date of each law and marriages would have
already been planned by the time the laws were announced, as they are usually
scheduled in advance.
1.3 Previous literature
The evidence in support of or against the end-of-marriage hypothesis is re-
markably sparse and is mostly conducted by members of various advocacy groups.
The arguments usually rest on the interpretation of aggregate trends or on anecdo-
tal evidence from the Netherlands and from the Scandinavian countries. In a long
series of articles focusing on the Netherlands and on the Scandinavian countries,
Kurtz (2004a,b,c,d) argues that the legalization of same-sex marriage or registered
partnership led to an increase in out-of-wedlock childbirth, a decline in the mar-
riage rate and an increase in alternative family arrangements. His argument is that
the legalization of same-sex marriage (and, implicitly, the introduction of registered
partnership) created the idea that any family form is acceptable. As such, the coun-
tries that legalized any form of legal recognition of same-sex couples, be it marriage
or registered partnership, experienced a crumbling of the family structure, with more
children being born to unmarried parents and less people choosing to marry at all.
His conclusions rest entirely on the graphical analysis of aggregate data and on the
anecdotal evidence found in local media.
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Similarly, Fagan and Smith (2004) use aggregate data from the Netherlands
to calculate a number of indicators that point to a deterioration in the traditional
family structure. In particular, they note an increase in the number of children born
out of wedlock or who live in single-parent families, in induced abortions and in the
number of people who choose not to have children. They also report a decrease in
the number of married people and an increase in the number of divorced people.
The response from proponents of same-sex marriage uses the same graphical
tools to rebuke the claims above. Badgett (2004a,b), for instance, uses the same
Dutch and Scandinavian aggregate data to argue that there is a long-term downward
trend in the marriage rate that the articles above ignore and that, once this trend
is taken into account, there is no decline in the marriage rate after the legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage. Similarly, non-marital births rates did not experience a
faster increase after the legalization of same-sex marriage or registered partnership.
In addition, most of the parents are still married—for example, the likelihood of
cohabiting parents in Sweden to break up is lower than the likelihood of married
parents in the U.S. to break up (Cherlin, 2009). Eskridge and Spedale (2006) reach
the same conclusions by analyzing data from all Scandinavian countries that intro-
duced registered partnership during the 1990s. Finally, Mello (2004), Cahill (2004)
and Eskridge and Spedale (2006) bring extensive anecdotal evidence to support the
claim that same-sex marriage or registered partnership did not or would not affect
negatively heterosexual marriage.
All these studies suffer from two major problems. First, they implicitly assume
that the only reason why marriage rates (or alternative indicators of family struc-
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ture) change is the legalization of same-sex marriage or the introduction of same-sex
registered partnership. In reality, that there are many factors that can bring about
changes in the marriage rate as the examples at the beginning of this chapter show.
Ignoring these factors can lead to the contradicting conclusions offered by the media
while using the same aggregate data.
Second, all these studies assume that the marriage rate prior to the legalization
of registered partnership or of same-sex marriage is an appropriate counterfactual
for what the marriage rate would have been in the absence of the two laws. This,
again, ignores the fact that there are many changes in the environment that can
lead to changes in the marriage rate. One cannot disentangle the effect of a same-
sex marriage law from changes caused by population shifts only by looking at the
marriage rates after the introduction of same-sex marriage.
1.4 Summary of findings
In this dissertation, I address both of the issues mentioned above. In chap-
ter 2, I conduct my analysis at the individual level. I first construct a unique and
highly confidential individual-level data set that includes demographic characteris-
tics as well as information on the marriage decisions over the period 1995–2005 for
a significant fraction of the Dutch population. I then estimate a duration model
for age at first marriage. Using multiple specifications, I calculate the effect of the
registered partnership law and of the same-sex marriage law on the first-marriage
rate. I find that not controlling for other factors or for unobserved heterogeneity in
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the propensity to marry introduces significant biases in the results. My estimates
from specifications with unobserved heterogeneity suggest that the marriage rate
increases after the enactment of the registered partnership law and falls after the
same-sex marriage law came into effect. However, this pattern is not uniform. In-
dividuals living in the more conservative municipalities commonly called the Dutch
Bible belt tend to marry less after the registered partnership law, but their marriage
rate returns to the long-term trend after the same-sex marriage law. In contrast,
individuals living in the four largest cities (the more liberal areas) marry less after
both laws. Finally, people residing outside these two regions follow the same pattern
as the overall marriage rate, marrying more after the registered partnership law and
less after the same-sex marriage law.
A limitation of the individual-level analysis is that I cannot construct a counter-
factual—what the marriage rate would have been in the absence of same-sex mar-
riage laws. To address this concern, in chapter 3 I turn to aggregate data and I use
the method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) to construct a synthetic
control for the Netherlands. This synthetic control is a weighted average of the
marriage rates of the OECD member countries such that its evolution before 1998
(the year when the registered partnership law was enacted) matches the evolution
of the marriage rate in the Netherlands. The weights for each country are data-
driven, calculated by matching the values of the marriage rate and its determinants
in the synthetic control to the corresponding values in the Netherlands for the period
1988–1997. A comparison of the Dutch marriage rate to the synthetic marriage rate
confirms the average findings from the individual-level specifications: different-sex
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couples marry more after the registered partnership law, but less after the same-sex
marriage law.
Another advantage of the aggregate data is that it allows me to analyze both
different-sex marriages and different-sex unions, i.e. marriages and registered part-
nerships. The results suggest that the rate of different-sex unions increases after
the registered partnership law (not surprisingly, since the marriage rate increases)
and then falls after the enactment of the same-sex marriage law, so that the rate of
different-sex unions after 2001 remains close to the rate predicted by the synthetic
control.
In conclusion, the introduction of registered partnership, both for same-sex
and for different-sex couples, does not seem to have negative effects on different-sex
marriage in the short term—indeed, there is an increase in the different-sex marriage
rate between 1998 and 2000. However, the different-sex marriage rate falls after the
legalization of same-sex marriage.
There can be at least two explanations for the decline in the diferent-sex
marriage rate after 2001 and for the fact that the different-sex union rate returns to
the long-term trend during the same period. The first explanation is that couples
learn over time about registered partnership and shift gradually from marriage to
registered partnership. The long-term effect of the introduction of (different-sex)
registered partnership would therefore be to sort couples across the two institutions
without changing the total number of couples willing to formalize their relationship.
The second explanation is the end-of-marriage argument: the same-sex mar-
riage law changes the value of marriage for some couples, who choose not to marry
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anymore. The fact that some of these couples choose cohabitation over registered
partnership would be offset by the fact that some other couples who were not con-
sidering marriage would enter registered partnership, such that the total number of
different-sex unions stays more or less the same (around the long-term trend).
Finally, note that it is practically impossible to disentangle the long term
effects of the registered partnership law from the (short-term) effects of the same-
sex marriage law. In fact, additional evidence from the survey conducted by Boele-
Woelki et al. (2006) suggests that the post-2001 evolution of the marriage rate might
be due to both effects. It is also infeasible to gauge the relative magnitude of each
effect, i.e., it is impossible to attribute the decline in the marriage rate after 2001
to either the long-term effect of the registered partnership law or to the short-term





In this chapter, I use individual-level data to analyze marriage behavior before
and after the enactment of each law. This type of analysis goes two important steps
further than the graphical analysis conducted until now on this topic. First, although
I still refer to the period before the enactment of the laws as the counterfactual, I
control for a variety of factors that could have affected the marriage rate during this
period and that the previous literature ignores. Second, by using individual data I
am able to uncover different responses in different groups in the population, which
allows me to better assess the validity of the end-of-marriage argument.
I construct a unique and highly confidential individual-level data set by com-
bining administrative data from the Dutch Municipal Records with the Dutch Labor
Force Survey. The resulting data set includes demographic characteristics as well
as information on the marriage decisions over the period 1995–2005 for almost 10
percent of the Dutch population. I focus on young individuals in order to elim-
inate selection bias and I apply a duration model for age at first marriage. An
important aspect in duration models is unobserved heterogeneity. A model that
does not consider the possibility that people can differ on dimensions hidden to the
researchers can be severely biased. I start by estimating models without unobserved
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heterogeneity and I contrast them with models including unobserved heterogeneity.
I model the heterogeneity as a discrete distribution, similar to Heckman and Singer
(1984). The discrete distribution is particularly intuitive in this case (as opposed to
a continuous distribution such as Gamma) because it separates the population into
individuals who are more or less likely to marry.
As expected, I find that not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the
propensity to marry introduces significant biases in the results. My estimates from
specifications with unobserved heterogeneity suggest that the marriage rate is not
negatively affected by the enactment of the registered partnership law, but it falls
after the same-sex marriage law came into effect. However, this pattern is not uni-
form. I use the fact that different regions are characterized by different patterns
in marriage, fertility, divorce, cohabitation and voting to separate individuals into
three groups based on their residence. The first group includes individuals living
in the more conservative municipalities commonly called the Dutch Bible, where
the marriage and fertility rates are higher than the average and the divorce and co-
habitation rates are lower than the average (Sobotka and Adigüzel, 2002; Statistics
Netherlands, 2003). At the opposite extreme are the four largest cities: Amsterdam,
Utrecht, Rotterdam and the Hague, where the marriage and fertility rates are lower
than the average and the divorce and cohabitation rates are higher than the average.
Finally, the rest of the country is considered all together as the third group. Using
specifications that separate the effect of the laws across these three regions, I find
that individuals in the Bible belt tend to marry less after the registered partner-
ship law, but their marriage rate returns to the long-term trend after the same-sex
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marriage law. In contrast, individuals living in the four largest cities (the more
liberal areas) marry less after each law. Finally, people residing outside these two
regions follow the same pattern as the overall marriage rate, marrying more after
the registered partnership law and less after the same-sex marriage law.
My results indicate that individuals living in the more conservative regions
are not negatively affected by the same-sex marriage law. However, individuals
residing in the more liberal areas marry less after each law, which suggests that they
learn over time about the alternative to marriage, registered partnership, and they
increasingly switch to it from marriage. Finally, the rest of the Netherlands and the
country as a whole experience no negative impact of the registered partnership law,
but a decline in the marriage rate after the same-sex marriage law. This pattern
is also consistent with the learning scenario, but also with a scenario where the
same-sex marriage law did indeed alter the value of marriage. I will return to these
possible alternatives in more detail later in this chapter and in chapter 3.
In the next section, I detail the empirical strategy used and the particular
issue it raises. I next describe the data and the construction of the sample. The
estimation results are presented in section 2.4, and section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical strategy
2.2.1 Specification of the hazard function
Duration models are regularly used in economics when the outcome measures
the length of stay in a particular state. Common examples include the study of
16
unemployment spells (Ham and Rea, 1987; Meyer, 1990; Addison and Portugal,
2003) or of strike duration (Kennan, 1985; Gunderson and Melino, 1990; Campolieti
et al., 2005). Although the research question in this paper is not one of the usual
suspects, a duration model is particularly useful for at least two reasons. First,
this type of models can easily handle individuals who do not marry while under
observation (censored spells), a useful feature given that the fraction of people who
are not married is rather high in the Netherlands: on average, 33 percent of the
marriage-age (18 year old and above) men and 25 percent of the marriage-age women
had never married between 1995 and 2005. Second and most importantly, duration
models allow for time-varying variables such as the enactment of the two laws.
Thus, I will use the framework of a duration model to analyze age at first
marriage. This choice of outcome variable is justified by several arguments. First,
the evolution of the marriage rate is largely driven by first marriages. As figure 2.1
shows, the variation in the number of marriages which are the first for either one of
the spouses closely tracks the variation in the total number of marriages. Second,
people who marry for the first time are on average 12–13 years younger that people
who re-marry. This makes them both potentially more impressionable to changes
in the perception of the institution of marriage, and more likely to be in the sample
(I will return to this last aspect at the end of this section and again in section 2.3).
Finally, previously-married people are likely to already have a formed opinion on
marriage and may not be likely to change it just because of the enactment of the
registered partnership law or of the same-sex marriage law. On the other hand, all
of these also imply that the conclusions of this analysis cannot be directly extended
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to the rest of the population, especially those in older age groups.
Let Ti be the random variable representing the age at first marriage age of
individual i, measured in full years, and define hi(t) as the probability that an
individual marries between ages t and t+ 1 conditional on never having married by
age t. The function hi(·) is the discrete time hazard of marriage. As in Ham and
Rea (1987), I will assume that it has the logit form1
hi(t) =
1
1 + exp {−yi(t)}
,
where
yi(t) = θ +Xi(t)
′β0 + p1(t)β1 + p2(t)β2 + γ(t).
In this equation, θ is a constant and Xi(t) is a vector of potentially time-varying
individual characteristics. The function γ(t) represents the form of duration de-
pendence, i.e. the common way age influences the probability of marriage for any
given person. The actual form of duration dependence is driven by the data in the
sense that γ(·) is the highest degree polynomial in ln(t) supported by the data. To
determine the degree of γ(·), I keep adding higher order terms until they become
insignificant, as suggested by Eberwein et al. (2002).
The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2, corresponding to p1(·) and p2(·),
1Alternatively, the hazard function can be assumed to have the extreme value (complementary
log-log) form





which can be derived from an underlying continuous-time proportional hazards model (Prentice
and Gloeckler, 1978; Meyer, 1990). The results from both specifications are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar, but the logit specification performed better by yielding higher values of the
log-likelihood (hence lower values of the Bayesian information criterion). Moreover, the likelihood
function with unobserved heterogeneity is much less well-behaved in the extreme value case.
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two indicator variables for the period 1998–2000 and after 2001, respectively. They
capture the change in the hazard (probability) of marriage during these two periods
as compared to the period before the enactment of either law. There are a few
reasons why these coefficients might not cleanly identify the effect of the two laws.
First, the laws could have delayed effects as people’s attitudes toward marriage
might not change instantaneously and marriages are planned ahead of time. In this
case, the coefficients would capture the short-term effect of the two laws. Second,
the long-term effect of the registered partnership law cannot be distinguished from
the short-term effect of the same-sex marriage law, simply because of the overlap in
the period when both laws are in effect. Finally, the effect of the same-sex marriage
law, both in the short term and in the long term, is unidentifiable if there is learning
about registered partnership: it is virtually impossible to estimate the effect of this
law in the absence of the registered partnership law.
2.2.2 Likelihood function and unobserved heterogeneity
The contribution to the likelihood function of person i, who is observed to
marry at age ai before the end of the study period, is the probability of marriage at
age ai:




This can be interpreted as being the product of the conditional probability of mar-
riage at age ai and the probabilities of not having married at each age prior to ai. If
the person does not marry by the end of the observation period, then the observa-
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tion is censored. Let ai be the last observed age of the individual. The contribution
to the likelihood function in this case is the survivor function, i.e. the probability of
marriage at an age higher than ai:




The likelihood function for a sample of N individuals is obtained from the




[P (Ti = ai)]
δi [P (Ti > ai)]
1−δi , (2.2)
where δi equals one if person i is observed to marry and zero otherwise. As long
as h(·) does not include an unobserved heterogeneity term, this likelihood can be
estimated using standard programs for logit specifications.2
A duration model without unobserved heterogeneity, however, will suffer from
a serious flaw that can be seen from the following example. Suppose people fall
in two categories: some who are more likely to marry young and some who are
more likely to delay marriage. Over time, individuals of the first type will marry
and exit the sample at a faster rate than individuals of the second type and the
sample will increasingly become a selected sample of people who are more likely
to delay marriage. Failure to account for this selection could severely bias the
2In the case of a extreme value hazard, the likelihood function can be estimated using standard
complementary log-log programs. In both cases, the only requirement is to create for each indi-
vidual one observation for each period they are observed (for example, if an individual is observed
for 5 years, there should be 5 observations in the data, one for each year).
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estimated results. A natural extension is to introduce unobserved heterogeneity
through the term θ (Ham and Rea, 1987). Following Heckman and Singer (1984), I
will assume that θ follows a discrete distribution with K points of support θ1, . . . , θK
and corresponding probabilities π1, . . . , πK (where, obviously,
∑K
k=1 πk = 1). In this
case, the contribution to the likelihood function of an individual observed to marry
at age ai is










and that of a censored observation is













1 + exp {−yi(t; θk)}
and
yi(t; θk) = θk +Xi(t)
′β0 + p1(t)β1 + p2(t)β2 + γ(t).
In this setup, initial conditions are a real concern. People become “at risk of
marriage” when they turn 18, the legal age of marriage for both men and women.
Following the same argument as above, a sample that includes persons who were
observed for the first time (entered the sample) when they were older than 18 is a
selected sample because people who are less likely to marry are over-represented.
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The contribution of individual i to the likelihood function should be conditional on
them not having married by age a0i, their age at entry into the sample:
P (Ti = ai|Ti ≥ a0i) =
P (Ti = ai)
P (Ti ≥ a0i)
, (2.4a)
P (Ti > ai|Ti ≥ a0i) =
P (Ti > ai)
P (Ti ≥ a0i)
. (2.4b)
If the model does not include unobserved heterogeneity, the conditional probabilities
in equation (2.4) depend only on the observed data from entry into the sample:

















In the case of unobserved heterogeneity, however, an estimation based on the un-
conditional contributions (2.3a) and (2.3b) will lead to incorrect estimates unless
P (Ti ≥ a0i) is somehow known. One possible approach is to make some additional
assumptions about the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in the period be-
fore entry into the sample (Ridder, 1984). However, the data on the evolution of
the time-varying elements of X over this period is not always available. To avoid
these issues, I restrict the analysis to a “flow sample” of individuals for whom the




One last aspect in the estimation is the calculation of marginal effects. This
is relatively trivial in the specifications without unobserved heterogeneity, as the
marginal effect is simply the marginal from the logit regressions. The issue is slightly
more complicated in the specifications including unobserved heterogeneity. As we
are interested in the effect of the two laws on the marriage rate, which is nothing but
the hazard function hi(·), I focus on the average marginal effect. For the parameter


















where N is the number of individuals in the sample and M =
∑N
i=1 ai is the total
number of individual-years.
I approximate the derivatives in the formula above using numerical derivatives.
If the parameter βj refers to the continuous variable Z
j, the average marginal effect





















where Z = (X(t), p1(t), p2(t)), Z
−j
i is the set of variables for individual i other than
the variable Zj, ∆ is an arbitrarily small number, and ĥi(·) is the estimated hazard









ŷi(t, θ̂k, Z) = θ̂k +Xi(t)
′β̂0 + p1(t)β̂1 + p2(t)β̂2 + γ̂(t)
In the case of a dummy variable Zj, the average marginal effect is approximated by

















This last formula needs to be applied cautiously when the dummy variable Zj is part
of a set of categorical dummy variables (e.g., ethnicity dummies or the two period
dummies). In this case, the comparison should be made with respect to the omitted
category, for which all the other dummy variables from the set are equal to zero. One
way to ensure the correct calculation of marginal effects is to restrict the sample to
the individual-years for which all the other corresponding categorical dummies are
equal to zero (obviously, in this case M is the corresponding number of individual-
years). For example, to calculate the marginal effect of p1(·), the 1998–2000 period
dummy, I restrict the sample to individual-years for the period 1995–2000, for which
p2(·), the 2001–2005 period dummy, is equal to zero.
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2.3 Data
I create the data using ten waves of the restricted version of the Dutch Labor
Force Survey (1996–2005) and the January 2006 snapshot of the highly confidential
Dutch Municipal Records. The Labor Force Survey (Enquête Beroepsbevolking, or
EBB) is an annual cross-sectional random survey of the population 15 years of age
and older. It includes information on educational attainment, ethnicity, employ-
ment and other demographic and labor market characteristics at the time of the
interview. In addition, the restricted version provides an identification number that
can be used to match the individuals to other data sets maintained by Statistics
Netherlands. The ten waves of the survey combined yield information on almost
950,000 individuals, or approximately six percent of the average population over the
period 1995–2005.
The Dutch Municipal Records (Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie) include
detailed information on changes in the marital status and residence of the entire
resident population for the period between January 1, 1995 and January 1, 2006.
Statistics Netherlands made available to me information on the individuals included
in the ten waves of the Labor Force Survey. Using the identification number, these
individuals are matched to their full marriage and residence history, both before
and after their survey interview. The result is a longitudinal data set for the period
1995–2005 including information on ethnicity, marital status and residence over the
whole period, and educational attainment and school enrollment at the time of
the Labor Force Survey interview. Finally, the data is augmented with the yearly
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unemployment rate at the regional level.3
The variables included in the analysis measure the attractiveness of an in-
dividual on the marriage market (age, education and ethnicity), the thickness of
the market (location and ethnicity), and business cycle fluctuations (the regional
unemployment rate). As long as the variables from the Labor Force Survey are
time-invariant, their inclusion in the final longitudinal data set will not cause prob-
lems. However, there are two cases when this does not hold. First, about 15 percent
of the sample was still enrolled in some form of education at the time of the survey
(approximately 9 percent full-time and 6 percent part-time). To increase the prob-
ability that the highest educational level reported, either completed or in progress,
is the actual highest level attained, I restrict the initial sample to individuals who
were at least 20 years of age in the year of the interview.4
Second, some variables such as age, residence or the unemployment rate can
change continuously. These variables need to be aggregated because I am using a
discrete-time approach. I do this on a calendar year basis rather than according to
the birth date of individuals for two reasons. First, it would be practically impossible
to measure the regional unemployment rate on a different scale than the calendar
year. Second, there is a strong seasonal pattern in marriages that suggests that
people make marriage decisions based on the calendar year rather than their birth
3The Netherlands is divided into twelve provinces: Drenthe, Flevoland, Friesland, Gelder-
land, Groningen, Limburg, Noord-Brabant, Noord-Holland, Overijssel, Utrecht, Zeeland and Zuid-
Holland.
4A small fraction of the individuals still in school were enrolled in a lower educational level
than their highest level completed (for example, persons with a college degree in science enrolled
in professional economics or business courses). The highest of the two educational levels was used
for these cases. The Dutch education system, the flows among different educational attainments
and the grouping of educational attainments used are shown in figure 2.A.
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dates. For example, about 61 percent of marriages between 1995 and 2005 were
performed during the “summer months” (from May to September).
Therefore, I will measure age as the age in full years at the end of the calendar
year, so that 17 year-old persons at the beginning of the year who get married by
the end of the year (after turning 18) are included in the sample. In contrast, I will
consider the residence at the beginning of the year, under the assumption that most
marriage decisions are made in advance and thus the location at the beginning of the
year is likely to influence the marital decision. Finally, the regional unemployment
rate is the average over the calendar year provided by Statistics Netherlands.
Recall that, as explained in section 2.2, using data from all the individuals can
be problematic due to initial conditions. Ideally, I would discard all the individuals
who were older than 18 when first observed, but this can cause more problems. The
average age at first marriage increased during this period from 29.6 to 32.4 years for
men and from 27.4 to 29.7 years for women. If the sample includes only individuals
who turned 18 in or after 1995, the oldest person in the sample would be 29 years old
in 2005. This is below the average age at first marriage for both men and women,
so the number of observed marriages will be low and so will be the power of the
estimation. The compromise is to include individuals in an age group that accounts
for a small fraction of the total number of marriages, i.e., keep individuals such that
P (T ≥ a0i) in equations (2.4) is close to one. Men 18–24 years old account for about
10 percent of first marriages, so I restrict the sample of men to individuals 18–24
years old in 1995 or when first observed. In other words, men enter the sample in the
calendar year they turn 18 or in 1995 if they were never-married at the beginning of
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the year and were 18–24 year old. I restrict the sample in similar fashion to women
18–22 years old, who also account for about 10 percent of first marriages.
Finally, I conduct the analysis separately by gender because men and women
seem to have different attitudes toward marriage. For example, men tend to marry
later than women: between 1995 and 2005, the average age at first marriage in the
Netherlands is consistently higher by about 2 years for men than for women (29.5 to
32.5 years of age for men, compared to 27.5 to 30 years of age for women). Also, the
fraction of women who marry previously-married men is higher than the fraction of
men who marry previously-married women. During the sample period, 10.3 to 11.6
percent of all women marrying for the first time and 8.6 to 9.7 percent of all men
marrying for the first time had a partner who had been married.
The Municipal Records provide very detailed data and, like many administra-
tive data sets, reduce or eliminate the measurement error in the variables. However,
they also present several disadvantages. First, no distinction is made between same-
sex and different-sex marriages—they are both coded as “marriage”. Second, due
to the sensitive nature of the data, I have no data on individuals who did not par-
ticipate in the Labor Force Survey. Thus, there is no information on the spouse
of an individual unless he or she also participated in the Labor Force Survey. Fi-
nally, the coding of addresses changed over time and was aggregated at the street
address level since 2003, making it practically impossible to identify the spouse of
an individual even if the information for that person were made available. As a
result, I am unable to separate individuals entering a different-sex marriage from
those entering a same-sex marriage. This induces an upward bias in the estimate of
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the different-sex marriage rate after 2001 and is problematic only if I find that the
effect of the same-sex marriage law is positive (or insignificant). I further address
this issue in chapter 3 by using aggregate data, where I can distinguish between
different-sex and same-sex marriages.
A second disadvantage of the data is that the information on labor market
outcomes applies to only one point in time. The highest level of education attained
is plausibly constant over the eleven years of the study period, but this is less likely
to be the case with employment status, industry or occupation. Therefore, I cannot
use any of these variables from the Labor Force Survey, except for what is implicitly
included in the regional unemployment rate.
The final sample includes 70,718 men and 53,803 women. The higher number
of men is simply due to the selection process. In addition, since women tend to
marry younger, there will be more never-married men then women for every single
age group. Descriptive statistics for the sample, separately by sex, are listed in
table 2.1. All the statistics and the subsequent analysis use the sample weights
provided in the Labor Force Survey.5
The youth of the sample is evident from the first statistic. The average age at
first marriage is around 27 years for men and 25 years for women, significantly lower
than the average age at first marriage in the entire population during this period.
Censored individuals (persons who do not marry until the end of 2005) have a similar
age distribution, with only slightly higher average age. This is not surprising given
5The sample weights refer to the year of the interview. Under the assumption that the structure
of the population did not change significantly during the period under study, I rescale the weights
to represent the probability of interview relative to the entire sample of ten waves of the Labor
Force Survey.
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that figure 2.2, which plots the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the probability of being
single by age (the survival function), shows that about half of the oldest individuals
had not married by 2005. Overall, only 26.29 percent of men and 33.30 percent of
women married by the end of 2005.
The main difference in the two subsamples is due to the initial age restriction.
While the bulk of the individuals in the sample were born between 1970 and 1984,
the age distribution is different for men because the sample includes older people.
The 1970–1974 birth cohort consists of men who were between 21–24 years old in
1994, but only 21 and 22 year-old women, which explains why it accounts for 41.04
percent of men and only 23.79 percent of women.
Note also that the distribution of education is skewed toward higher levels
of education. Only about 28 percent of men and 23 percent of women have at
most a high school (general secondary) degree. Almost 40 percent of both men
and women have some post-secondary vocational training, while higher vocational
training and college degrees account for 23.16 and 9.05 percent of men and 28.39
and 8.67 percent of women, respectively. Approximately 83 percent of the sample
are natives and almost 8 percent are Western immigrants, i.e. people from Europe
(except Turkey), North America, Oceania (including Australia and New Zealand),
Japan, and Indonesia. Immigrants from potentially more conservative areas such
as the predominantly Muslim countries Turkey and Morocco, or Dutch current and
former territories Aruba and Suriname, account for about 6 percent of both men
and women.
The Netherlands is one of the most urban countries in Europe, as approxi-
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mately 63 percent of the sample resides in urban areas. However, there is geographic
heterogeneity with respect to people’s attitudes toward marriage and cohabitation.
One area that I will focus on comprises the four largest cities (Amsterdam, the
Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht) and exhibits low fertility and marriage rates and
high non-marital birth and divorce rates, as well as low frequency of church-going.
Another area of interest is the so-called Dutch Bible belt (De Bijbelgordel), a set
of municipalities characterized by relatively high church participation, high fertility
rates, low cohabitation and divorce rates, low non-marital birth rates, and high fre-
quency of church-going (Sobotka and Adigüzel, 2002; Statistics Netherlands, 2003).
These two areas are identified on the map in figure 2.3.
Summary statistics for each region are shown in table 2.2. At exit from the
sample, i.e. when marrying or at the end of 2005 for individuals still single, the frac-
tion of people in the four largest cities is much larger than the fraction of people in
the Bible belt—15.16 percent compared to 2.71 percent for men and 16.26 percent
compared to 2.73 percent for women. Yet the fraction of marriages is disproportion-
ately high in the Bible belt: 4.39 percent of first-marrying men and 4.42 percent
of first-marrying women reside in the Bible belt, while only 12.11 percent of first-
marrying men and 12.03 perecent of first-marrying women reside in the four largest
cities.6 The difference between the two regions is also evident from the percentage
of their residents who marry, which is more than twice higher in the Bible belt
(42.60 percent against 21 percent for men and 53.93 percent against 12.03 percent
6One explanation for this is that single people tend to move to cities, where the marriage
markets are thicker, but (married) couples tend to move outside of the cities, where housing is
cheaper (Gautier et al., 2005). Thus, the number of single individuals in the cities tends to be
higher than in the more rural areas that comprise the Bible belt.
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for women).
Based on this evidence and the patterns of church-going, fertility and divorce
mentioned above, I will consider the four largest cities to represent mostly liberal
individuals and the Bible belt municipalities to include mostly conservative people.
This distinction can be used to determine the impact of the two laws on individuals
based on the individuals’ degree of conservatism.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Baseline regressions
I first estimate the discrete-time duration model in section 2.2 without un-
observed heterogeneity. Recall that the coefficients represent the effect of the cor-
responding variables on the probability that a given individual marries during the
calendar year. In other words, they represent the effect of the variables on the mar-
riage rate in a given year. Recall also that the sample of men and of women are not
the opposite sides of an accounting equation: the spouses of the men in the sample
who marry are not necessarily in the sample of women and vice versa. As a result,
there are differences in the coefficient estimates between the two genders and in the
estimated marriage rates.
The results from the baseline regressions for men are provided in table 2.3. To
show the importance of taking individual-level characteristics and aggregate factors
into account, I start with a simple set of covariates and then discuss the change
in the coefficients as new variables are added. Some of the variables are common
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to all the specifications. First, I always include the two dummy variables that
represent each of the two new law regimes. I also add a linear trend to capture
changes in marriage behavior not accounted for by the other explanatory variables,
such as the increased secularization of the Dutch society. Thus, the coefficients on
the two period dummies should be interpreted as deviations from the long-term
trend in the marriage rate in comparison to the period before 1998. Also present
in all specifications is a sixth-degree polynomial in the natural log of age minus 17
(since the minimum legal age of marriage is 18) to account for duration dependence.
Finally, a set of dummy variables representing five-year birth cohorts is included in
all but the first specification.
The specification in columns 1 and 5 controls only for duration dependence
and is similar to the type of aggregate analysis present in the media that takes into
account the long-term trend in the marriage rate. For both sexes there is a secular
decline in their first-marriage rate, as shown by the estimated negative trend terms.
In the sample of men, both laws were followed by a higher propensity to marry,
which is basically Badgett’s (2004b) argument that the marriage rate did not fall
after the enactment of same-sex marriage laws once the downward trend is taken
into account. Women, however, are estimated to marry less after the enactment of
the same-sex marriage law.
The difference in the pattern of the marriage rate still holds after adding
controls for demographic characteristics (education, ethnicity and birth cohort) as
shown in columns 2 and 6: men are again estimated to marry more after both laws,
while women marry less after the same-sex marriage law. This is not surprising
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because none of the variables added changes over time and therefore they should have
no impact on the coefficients of time-varying variables such as the trend or the two
law regime dummies. What does emerge from this exercise is that the relationship
between education and marriage is also different between men and women. The
estimates show the propensity to marry relative to the omitted category, which
is an intermediate level of education between the general secondary and higher
professional levels.7 They suggest an almost inverted U-shaped pattern for men,
with the least and the most educated having the lowest propensities to marry. For
women, on the other hand, the relationship is more skewed, lower educated women
having higher propensities to marry but higher educated women being much less
likely to marry. These patterns are consistent with a scenario of female hypergamy
(women “marry up”) and male hypogamy (men “marry down”), such that lower
educated women have a better chance of finding a match, and higher educated
people have lower propensities to marry, in general.
Ethnicity influences the decision to marry in an expected way. Compared
to natives, both men and women with a Western background or from Suriname
and Aruba are less likely to marry in the Netherlands, while people from the more
conservative Turkey and Morocco are much more likely to marry. Men from other
countries seem to have higher tendency to marry, while women they seem to be
similar to natives in this regard.
Finally, the addition of demographic characteristics improves the fit of the
7Keep in mind that the numbers are not comparable across equations because logit coefficients
are measured with respect to the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
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model. The values of the log-likelihood can be directly compared since the spec-
ifications are nested. For men, the log-likelihood in column 2 is higher by 0.88%
than the one in column 1 (from −9973.84 to −9885.94), while for women the log-
likelihood in column 6 is is 2.11% higher than the one in column 5 (from −8966.37
to −8777.34).8
Columns 3 and 7 add the regional unemployment rate, an indicator of the busi-
ness cycle that varies both over time and cross-sectionally. Higher unemployment
is associated with lower marriage rates for both men and women, which could be
due to couples delaying marriage during economic downturns. Its inclusion does not
affect the estimated effects of education and ethnicity, which are the time-invariant
variables. It does, however, change the estimated trend in the marriage rate and the
period dummies. Unlike in the first two columns, column 3 shows that both men
and women are estimated to marry less after each law, while the long-term trend
becomes less negative.
Finally, columns 4 and 8 add information on the residence of individual which,
as mentioned before, can and does change over time. Living in an urban area is
associated with a lower propensity to marry, even lower if the individual resides in
one of the four largest cities. In contrast, individuals who live in the Bible belt
are estimated to marry significantly more. The effects of education and ethnicity
are virtually unaffected, as are the effect of the unemployment rate and the long-
term trend. The estimates of the period dummies change yet again, becoming even
8The values of the log-likelihood are divided by 1,000 throughout the paper in order to improve
readability.
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more negative. This suggests that the marriage patterns were influenced by the
migration patterns described in section 2.3. Over time, people are more likely to
move to urban areas or to one of the largest cities in order to find a better match.
People (already) living in these urban areas are less likely to marry because of
lower religiosity (Sobotka and Adigüzel, 2002). These two effects offset each other
and lead to overestimated marriage rates in the later periods represented by the
two period dummies. Once controls for the migration patterns are included, the
marriage rate is estimated to fall by even more after the enactment of two laws.
Note also that including the location variables increases the likelihood function by
much more than the inclusion of the regional unemployment rate (from −9884.76 to
−9846.89 for men and from −8776.94 to −8732.63 for women), one more indication
of the importance of these variables.
Although the form of duration dependence is rather flexible, it might be argued
that a non-parametric approach could be more accurate. In order to make sure
that the polynomial form chosen is a good approximation of the actual form of
duration dependence, I also ran the specification in columns 4 and 8 by replacing
the polynomial in log-age with a set of age dummies. The results, listed in table 2.A
(for comparison, columns 1 and 3 are the same as columns 4 and 8 in table 2.3), show
that most of the coefficients are virtually unchanged. A comparison of the fit of the
model with the previous case can be performed using the Bayesian (or Schwartz)
information criterion (for which lower values indicate better fit). The BIC is almost
the same for the models in columns 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, respectively, suggesting
that the polynomial form is a good approximation for the actual form of duration
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dependence.
The magnitude of the estimated effects on the marriage rate is relatively large,
considering the marginal effects calculated for the specification in column 4. The
marriage rate of men over the 1995–2005 period is, on average, 2.99 percent and
is estimated to fall by 0.06 percentage points after the registered partnership law
and by 0.16 percentage points after the same-sex marriage law, compared to a long-
term downward trend of 0.05 percentage points per year. In the case of women, the
average marriage rate is 4.07 percent and the decline is 0.14 percentage points and
0.65 percentage points, respectively, while the downward trend is 0.05 percentage
points per year.
2.4.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
As mentioned in section 2.2, a duration model without unobserved heterogene-
ity can yield severely biased estimates. I assume that the unobserved heterogeneity
term follows a discrete distribution with two mass points.9 I use the parametric
form of duration dependence for because models with both nonparametric unob-
served heterogeneity and nonparametric duration dependence have been shown to
suffer from severe bias (Baker and Melino, 2000). Moreover, as seen in the previous
section, using non-parametric duration dependence does not significantly change the
results.
Columns 2 and 4 in table 2.4 report the results from the models including
9Previous research found that two mass points are in general sufficient (Narendranathan and
Stewart, 1993; Ham and Rea, 1987). A distribution with three mass points produced basically un-
changed estimates and increased the log-likelihood function only by about 0.5%, but the likelihood
function converged with much more difficulty.
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unobserved heterogeneity. For comparison, columns 1 and 3 report the specifications
without unobserved heterogeneity (columns 4 and 8 in table 2.3). For both men and
women, the registered partnership law (period 1) is now associated with an increase
in the marriage rate, while the same-sex law (period 2) is followed by a decline. The
reduction in the marriage rate after 2001 is, however, much smaller than estimated
by the model without unobserved heterogeneity (columns 4 and 5).
The inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity leaves some of the estimates virtu-
ally unchanged, such as the regional unemployment rate or the long-term trend. It
does, however, alter some of the other coefficients. For instance, the relationship
between education and marriage changes slightly. The pattern remains more or
less the same for men, but it becomes steeper and more linear for women. This
lends even more support to the idea that women tend to marry up, making it more
difficult for higher educated women to find a match. Ethnicity seems to influence
the propensity to marry in similar ways for both men and women, unlike the results
with no unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, women of non-Western background
seem to marry more than natives, whereas before they were estimated to marry less.
Residence seems to influence the marriage rate even more than before: living in an
urban area or in one of the four largest cities is associated with even lower propen-
sities to marry. In contrast, residence in the Bible belt increases the probability of
marriage by even more.
The magnitude of the marginal effects is much smaller than in the case when
unobserved heterogeneity was ignored. The marriage rate of men increases by 0.02
percentage points after the registered partnership law and falls by 0.13 percentage
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points after the same-sex marriage law, while the downward trend is 0.12 percentage
points per year. Women experience an increase in the marriage rate after 1998 of
0.13 percentage points, but a larger decline after the same-sex marriage law at -0.59
percentage points. The downward trend in their marriage rate is estimated at 0.09
percentage points per year.
Finally, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity improves the fit of the regres-
sion. The BIC in the models with unobserved heterogeneity is smaller than the BIC
in the corresponding model with unobserved heterogeneity.
2.4.3 Heterogeneous effects by location
The results presented in the previous section suggest that the residence of
individuals is related to the timing of marriage. In this section, I analyze in more
detail this relationship by modifying the specification of the hazard function, still
using the logit form
hi(t) =
1
1 + exp {−yi(t)}
,
but where










2 + p1(t)[1− LCi(t)−BBi(t)]βOTH1
+ p2(t)[1− LCi(t)−BBi(t)]βOTH2 + γ(t),
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X(·) includes the same set of variables as before (including location in a large city
or in the Bible belt), and BBi(t) and LCi(t) are dummy variables for individual i
residing in the Bible belt or in one of the four largest cities in year at the beginning of
year t. In this specification, βBB1 and β
BB
2 represent the change in the propensity to
marry among individuals living in the Bible belt after the enactment of the registered
partnership law and of the same-sex marriage law, respectively. Similarly, βLC1 and
βLC2 represent the change in the marriage rate among individuals residing in one
of the four largest cities following the legalization of registered partnership and of
same-sex marriage, respectively. Finally, βOTH1 and β
OTH
2 capture similar changes
for individuals living outside the Bible belt or the four largest cities.
I start again by estimating a model with no unobserved heterogeneity. The
results are shown in columns 1 and 3 in table 2.5. As before, residence in the Bible
belt is associated with a higher probability of marriage and residence in the four
largest cities is associated with a lower marriage rate as compared to the rest of
the Netherlands, for both men and women. The registered partnership law was
followed by reductions in the marriage rate in both areas. However, a one-sided F-
test indicates that the decline in the marriage rate between 1998 and 2001 in the four
largest cities is significantly larger than the decline in the Bible belt (F-statistic =
19.67 for men and 19.02 for women). In contrast, the reduction in the marriage rate
after the same-sex marriage law was larger in the Bible belt than in the four largest
cities (F-statistic = 359.74 for men and 32.84 for women). Within each region, the
marriage rate fell even more after the introduction of same-sex marriage, with the
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exception of men in the four largest cities.10 Finally, individuals living outside these
two areas seem not to be affected by the introduction of registered partnership, but
they do marry less after the legalization of same-sex marriage.
Columns 2 and 4 show the results from the specification including unobserved
heterogeneity. While location still has the same overall effect on the marriage rate—
higher in the Bible belt and lower in the four largest cities—its evolution after the
enactment of the two laws is now significantly different. The marriage rate in the
Bible belt fell after the registered partnership law came into effect, by 0.15 percent-
age points for men and 0.19 percentage points for women. However, it increased
(relative to the long-term downward trend) after the enactment of same-sex mar-
riage law (the F-statistic for the test of equality of the coefficients is 66.82 for men
and 3.47 for women, rejecting the hypothesis in both cases). People residing in the
four largest cities also married less after the registered partnership law by approx-
imately -0.60 percentage points for both men and women, but they married even
less after the enactment of the same-sex marriage law (F-statistic = 183.82 for men
and 5604.64 for women, rejecting the hypothesis that the estimate for period 2 is
the same as the estimate for period 1). Moreover, the initial decline in the four
largest cities is larger than in the Bible belt, with an F-statistic of 130.92 for men
and 47.38 for women. Finally, both men and women residing outside of the Bible
belt or the four largest cities married more after the registered partnership law (by
0.12 percentage points for men and 0.25 for women) and less after the same-sex
10The F-statistics for the one-sided tests comparing the estimated coefficients for period 1 and
period 2 are: 1044.35 (men, Bible belt), 1885.10 (women, Bible belt), 0.005 (men, four largest
cities) and 2251.92 (women, four largest cities). In all cases but the last they fail to reject the
hypothesis that the decline in the marriage rate after 2001 is larger than during 1998–2000.
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marriage law (by 0.03 and 0.33 percentage points, respectively), consistent with the
results from the previous section.
These results indicate that there is variation in the response to the enactment
of the two laws. Individuals residing in the more conservative municipalities included
in the Bible belt seem to have been affected by the registered partnership law, but
their marriage rate recovers after 2001. A possible explanation for this pattern is
that these individuals had strong beliefs about the institution of marriage that were
not easily changed by the legalization of same-sex marriage.
On the other hand, individuals living in the more liberal four largest cities
marry relatively less after the enactment of the registered partnership law and even
less after the enactment of the same-sex marriage law. The first effect may be
driven by the existence of more individuals on the margin (who are swayed away
from marriage toward registered partnership) in the four largest cities than in the
Bible belt. The second effect is more intriguing, as one would expect people living
in more liberal areas to be unaffected by the same-sex marriage law. However, recall
that it is practically impossible to separately identify the influence of the two laws
separately on marriage decisions because of their overlap. Figure 2.4 suggests that
there might have been a learning process involved, as the number of new registered
partnerships contracted by different-sex couples increased in each year after 2000.
This could explain the fall in the propensity to marry after 2001, as more couples
consider this alternative to marriage.
Finally, individuals residing outside of the Bible belt or the four largest cities
tend to marry more after the enactment of the registered partnership law, but less
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after 2001, when the same-sex marriage law was enacted. This is a similar pattern
to the one found in the previous section for the overall marriage rate and could
be explained under two scenarios. First, the registered partnership law might have
a positive effect on the marriage rate in the short run, but as people learn about
the new institution over time, there is a gradual shift from marriage to registered
partnership and the effect of the registered partnership law becomes negative in the
long run. Second, the same-sex marriage law could have a negative effect on the
marriage rate that offsets any short- and long-term positive effects of the registered
partnership law. However, as described in section 2.2.1, it is practically impossible
to disentangle these two effects.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyze the validity of the claim that the institution of
marriage is negatively affected when opened to same-sex couples. I focus on the
Netherlands, the first country to legalize same-sex marriage in 2001, which also in-
troduced in 1998 an alternative institution, identical in almost all ways to marriage—
registered partnership. I study the marriage behavior at the individual level using
a discrete-time duration model, with and without unobserved heterogeneity. The
estimates indicate that the overall marriage rate increases after the enactment of the
registered partnership law, only to decline after the same-sex marriage law comes
into effect. In other words, the introduction of same-sex registered partnership does
not affect marriage negatively. It is impossible to establish, however, whether the
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decline in the marriage rate after 2001 is due to the legalization of same-sex marriage
or to learning about registered partnereship. I will return to this issue in the next
chapter, where I will also present some more (indirect) evidence.
I also find that the results differ by location, where the residence of individuals
is considered as an indicator of their liberalism. Individuals in the more liberal area
(the four largest cities) seem to marry less after each of the two laws, which is
consistent with them learning about registered partnership over time and switching
to the new institution. In contrast, individuals in the more conservative areas (the
Bible belt) marry less after the introduction of registered partnership but their
marriage rate increases after the legalization of same-sex marriage, returning to
levels similar to the period before 1998.
One concern with the method used in this chapter is that it considers the period
before the enactment of both laws as the counterfactual. If the set of variables Xi(t)
is large enough to control for any potential factor that could have affected marriage
patterns after 1998, then the results in section 2.4 are unbiased. In chapter 3, I turn
to aggregate data and I construct a more accurate counterfactual which will allow
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Figure 2.2: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function (the probability of still
being single by age)
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Figure 2.4: The number of new different-sex registered partnerships in the
Netherlands, 1998–2005
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Note: Numbers next to arrows represent percentages of a cohort.
Source: Dutch Ministry of Education and Science (2003)
Figure 2.A: The education system in the Netherlands and the definition of
educational attainment used, 2002
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Primary education 4.24 3.03
Secondary vocational 16.83 12.95
General secondary 6.83 7.10
Senior vocational 39.88 39.85




Western immigrants 7.71 7.80
Turks/Moroccans 3.21 3.43
Surinamese/Arubans 3.01 3.26
Other non-Western immigrants 2.97 2.66
Urban area 62.86 63.80
Number of individuals 70,718 53,883
Note: All statistics weighted using sample weights.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics, four largest cities and the Dutch Bible belt
Four largest cities Bible belt
(%) (%)
Men (N = 70, 718)
Location at exit from sample 15.16 2.71
Percent of total marriages 12.11 4.39
Percent of residents marrying 21.00 42.60
Women (N = 53, 803)
Location at exit from sample 16.26 2.73
Percent of total marriages 12.03 4.42
Percent of residents marrying 24.64 53.93
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: Discrete-time duration model for age at first marriage, with and
without unobserved heterogeneity
Men (N = 70, 718) Women (N = 53, 803)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Period 1 (1998–2000) −0.040∗ 0.005 −0.052∗ 0.028∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Period 2 (2001–2005) −0.101∗ −0.038∗ −0.234∗ −0.130∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Linear trend (1995=0) −0.034∗ −0.035∗ −0.017∗ −0.020∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (omitted category: Senior vocational)
Primary education −0.258∗ −0.127∗ 0.011∗ 0.545∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Secondary vocational −0.053∗ 0.035∗ 0.098∗ 0.400∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
General secondary −0.342∗ −0.501∗ −0.265∗ −0.418∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Higher professional −0.169∗ −0.331∗ −0.397∗ −0.691∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
College −0.172∗ −0.395∗ −0.647∗ −1.101∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Ethnicity (omitted category: Natives)
Western immigrants −0.157∗ −0.180∗ −0.194∗ −0.173∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Turks/Moroccans 1.270∗ 2.282∗ 1.608∗ 2.822∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Surinamese/Arubans −0.155∗ −0.079∗ −0.330∗ −0.164∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Other non-Western immigrants 0.141∗ 0.229∗ −0.009∗ 0.175∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Regional unemployment rate −0.032∗ −0.033∗ −0.022∗ −0.022∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban indicator −0.171∗ −0.201∗ −0.238∗ −0.324∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Bible belt 0.665∗ 0.904∗ 0.661∗ 1.004∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Four largest cities −0.248∗ −0.376∗ −0.268∗ −0.370∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Unobserved heterogeneity no yes no yes
Log-likelihood / 1000 -9846.89 -9802.94 -8732.63 -8641.61
BIC / 1000 19694.24 19606.25 17465.73 17283.57
Notes: All specifications are weighted using sample weights and include a sixth-degree
polynomial in ln(age− 17) and 5-year birth cohort dummies. Standard errors in brackets.
Unobserved heterogeneity is modeled as a discrete distribution with two mass points. BIC
is the Schwartz (Bayesian) Information Criterion. Starred coefficients are significant at
the 1 percent level.
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Table 2.5: Discrete-time duration model for the age at first marriage, by location
Men (N = 70, 718) Women (N = 53, 803)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bible belt
Main effect 0.968∗ 0.922∗ 0.994∗ 1.021∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Period 1 (1998–2000) −0.232∗ −0.044∗ −0.283∗ −0.041∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Period 2 (2001–2005) −0.483∗ 0.029 −0.640∗ −0.022
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Four largest cities
Main effect −0.029∗ −0.166∗ 0.076∗ −0.047∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Period 1 (1998–2000) −0.283∗ −0.185∗ −0.333∗ −0.127∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Period 2 (2001–2005) −0.283∗ −0.260∗ −0.580∗ −0.556∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Rest of the Netherlands
Period 1 (1998–2000) 0.006 0.035∗ 0.006 0.055∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Period 2 (2001–2005) −0.053∗ −0.009 −0.158∗ −0.072∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Linear trend (1995=0) −0.035∗ −0.035∗ −0.017∗ −0.020∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant −6.784∗ −6.128∗ −4.765∗ −8.233∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.013)
Unobserved heterogeneity no yes no yes
Log-likelihood / 1000 −9845.00 −9802.21 −8729.29 −8638.51
BIC / 1000 19690.54 19604.85 17459.12 17277.43
Notes: All specifications are weighted using sample weights and include controls for educ-
tion, ethnicity, regional unemployment rate, urbanization, 5-year birth cohort and a sixth-
degree polynomial in ln(age − 17). Standard errors in brackets. BIC is the Schwartz
(Bayesian) Information Criterion. Starred coefficients are significant at the 1 percent
level.
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Table 2.A: Discrete-time duration model for age at first marriage, specifications
with parametric and non-parametric duration dependence
Men (N = 70, 718) Women (N = 53, 803)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Period 1 (1998–2000) −0.040∗ −0.028∗ −0.052∗ −0.046∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Period 2 (2001–2005) −0.101∗ −0.087∗ −0.234∗ −0.230∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Linear trend (1995=0) −0.034∗ −0.035∗ −0.017∗ −0.017∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (omitted category: Senior vocational)
Primary education −0.258∗ −0.258∗ 0.011∗ 0.011∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Secondary vocational −0.053∗ −0.053∗ 0.098∗ 0.098∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
General secondary −0.342∗ −0.342∗ −0.265∗ −0.265∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Higher professional −0.169∗ −0.169∗ −0.397∗ −0.397∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
College −0.172∗ −0.172∗ −0.647∗ −0.647∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Ethnicity (omitted category: Natives)
Western immigrants −0.157∗ −0.157∗ −0.194∗ −0.194∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Turks/Moroccans 1.270∗ 1.270∗ 1.608∗ 1.608∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Surinamese/Arubans −0.155∗ −0.155∗ −0.330∗ −0.330∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Other non-Western immigrants 0.141∗ 0.141∗ −0.009∗ −0.009∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Regional unemployment rate −0.032∗ −0.030∗ −0.022∗ −0.022∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban indicator −0.171∗ −0.170∗ −0.238∗ −0.238∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Bible belt 0.665∗ 0.665∗ 0.661∗ 0.661∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Four largest cities −0.248∗ −0.247∗ −0.268∗ −0.268∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Duration dependence poly np poly np
Log-likelihood / 1000 −9846.89 −9846.28 −8732.63 −8732.27
BIC / 1000 19694.24 19693.22 17465.73 17465.14
Notes: All specifications are weighted using sample weights and include 5-year birth cohort
dummies. Duration dependence is modeled either as a sixth-degree polynomial in ln(age−
17) (“poly”) or as a set of age dummies (“np”). Standard errors in brackets. BIC is the






Th simple graphical analysis of the marriage rate present in the media assumes
that the only possible influence on the marriage rate is the introduction of registered
partnership or the legalization of same-sex marriage. Moreover, by comparing the
marriage rate before to the marriage rate after each of these legal changes, the
implicit assumption is that the “before” period is an appropriate counterfactual for
the “after” period. In most empirical cases, however, this is not the case.
The most common strategy to estimate the effects of an intervention is the
“differences-in-differences” method (Wooldridge, 2002). This method requires ob-
servations from two groups: one that was affected by the intervention, called the
“treated” group, and one that is similar to the treated group but was not affected
by the intervention, called the “control” group. The method then consists of com-
paring the difference in outcomes before and after the intervention in the treatment
and the control groups. This is done through an estimating equation of the form
Yit = X
′
itβ + Tiδ1 + Piδ2 + TiPiδ3 + εit, (3.1)
where Yit is the outcome of interest for unit i at time t, Xit is a set of characteristics,
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Ti is a dummy variable for individual i being in the treated group, and Pi is a dummy
variable for period t being after the intervention (the “post” period). The estimated
effect of the intervention is then δ3, the differential change in the outcome in the
treated group compared to the control group between the periods before and after
the intervention.
This estimation method relies on the identification of an appropriate control
group. The control group is used as the “counterfactual,” the evolution of the
outcome in the treated group in the absence of the intervention. Thus, the treated
and control groups should have experienced similar trends in their outcomes in
the absence of the intervention. The control group is usually chosen such that
the pre-intervention trends in the two groups are similar, indicating that the post-
intervention trends would have been similar as well in the absence of the intervention.
It should be clear now that the choice of a control group is crucial, since using
the wrong counterfactual can lead to severely biased inference. In some applications,
the control group is apparent for geographic, demographic or historical reasons (see,
for example, Card and Krueger, 1994; Almond et al., 2005; Tyler et al., 2000).
In other applications, such as my study, there is no obvious choice for the control
group. The major concern with the individual-level approach in the previous chapter
is that it uses the period before the enactment of the registered partnership law as
the counterfactual. In other words, since the two laws apply to all Dutch residents,
there is no group in the population that was not affected by the laws (i.e., there
is no control group) and the change in marriage rates after each law is interpreted
as resulting directly and only from the laws themselves. Inference based on this
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approach is biased if there were other factors that influenced the marriage decision
and that came into effect during the same period as the laws.
The alternative is to look for a country or a set of countries that can be used
as a control group. For historical and demographic reasons, the best control group
would have been Belgium. However, Belgium followed closely in the footsteps of
the Netherlands and enacted a registered partnership law in 2000 and a same-sex
marriage law in 2003. In the absence of an obvious control group, Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2007) suggest an alternative: a synthetic
control. The synthetic control is a weighted average of potential “donors” such that
the weighted average of their outcomes and of their determinant variables (the X’s)
exhibit a similar trend to the treated group in the period before the intervention.
This artificial data series provides a credible counterfactual because it takes into
account the evolution of both the outcome and its determinants.
In this chapter, I construct a synthetic control for the marriage rate in the
Netherlands as a weighted average of OECD member countries. The results sup-
port the conclusions reached in chapter 2. I also conduct several placebo tests that
support the validity of the method and of the results. Finally, I provide an inter-
pretation of these results using additional information from the survey of married
and registered couples conducted by Boele-Woelki et al. (2006).
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3.2 Construction of the synthetic control and estimation method
Similar to Abadie et al. (2007), let subscript 1 indicate the Netherlands and
let W = (w2, . . . , wJ+1) be a vector of weights assigned to the J potential donor
countries. Without any restrictions on the weights, a sufficiently large number of
potential donor countries and of determinant variables will lead to a synthetic control
that matches perfectly the evolution of the marriage rate in the Netherlands prior
to the introduction of the two laws. However, negative weights or weights larger
than one would be difficult to interpret. Hence, the weights are restricted to lie in
the unit interval (0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 for all j) and to sum up to one (
∑J+1
j=2 wj = 1), which
results in a synthetic control that will likely not match perfectly the trend in the
marriage rate before the two laws.
For the synthetic control, the marriage rate m∗1 and its determinants X
∗
1 are









Let T0 be the number of available periods before 1998 and let the vector


















as the vector obtained by combining the deter-
minants of the marriage rate prior to 1998 (T0) and these M linear combinations
of the pre-1998 marriage rate in the Netherlands. Next, consider the matrix Z0
constructed by combining similar vectors for the J potential donors, such that the








, where Xj is the set of determinants of
the marriage rate prior to 1998 in country j.
In principle, the linear combinations (K1, . . . , KM) are arbitrary. In practice,
Abadie et al. (2007) suggest choosing M = 1 and K = 1
T0
, such that the linear















for the j-th donor country.
Given this structure of the Z matrices, let V be a diagonal matrix of loadings
corresponding to all the variables (both the determinants X and the marriage rate
m). The optimal set of weights is the one that minimizes the weighted distance
between Z1 and Z0:
W ∗(V ) = argmin
√
(Z1 − Z0W )′V (Z1 − Z0W ).
The matrix V can be arbitrary, but a natural choice is the one that minimizes the
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mean squared error of the marriage rate in the synthetic control relative to the
actual marriage rate in the Netherlands (Abadie et al., 2007):
V ∗ = argmin
√
[m1 −m0W ∗(V )]′[m1 −m0W ∗(V )],
where m1 is a (T0 × 1) vector containing the marriage rate in the Netherlands and
m0 is a (T0 × J) matrix of marriage rates of the potential donors in the pre-1998
period. This ensures that the marriage rate in the synthetic control constructed
using the resulting weights W ∗(V ∗) is the best match to the marriage rate in the
Netherlands in the period before 1998.
In conclusion, the synthetic control is constructed by assigning a set of data-
driven weights to potential “donor” countries such that the weighted average of their
marriage rates and determinant variables closely match the marriage rate and the
determinant variables in the Netherlands during the “pre-treatment period” (before
the enactment of the first law, the registered partnership law). These weights are
calculated via an iterative two-step maximization problem. In the first step, each
variable (both in the set of determinants X and the marriage rate) is assigned
a loading and the country weights are calculated as a function of these loadings
so as to minimize the (weighted) distance between the synthetic control and the
Netherlands in terms of all the variables. In the second step, the variable loadings
are chosen so that the marriage rate in the control group matches the marriage rate




The list of potential donors includes all the OECD member countries that did
not enact a registered partnership or same-sex marriage law during the period 1988–
2004. After excluding Mexico and the Slovak Republic, for which not enough data
are available, the sample of potential donors consists of 17 countries: Australia, Aus-
tria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, New
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
The data on marriage rates and their determinants come from the OECD, Euro-
pean Union’s Eurostat, World Bank’s World Development Indicators, or national
statistical offices. The exact source and definition of each variable are provided in
appendix 3.A.
The ideal outcome variable would be the marriage rate measured among the
“population at risk,” i.e. single individuals legally allowed to marry. Unfortunately,
statistics agencies commonly report a different measure, the crude marriage rate,
defined as the total number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants. Figure 3.1 plots
these two different indicators using data on different-sex marriages and population
from Statistics Netherlands over the period between 1988 and 2004 (the two verti-
cal dotted lines correspond to 1998 and 2001, the years when registered partnership
and same-sex marriage were introduced). Since the marriage rate among unmarried
individuals of legal age to marry (the “correct” marriage rate) is much higher than
the crude marriage rate, the two measures are plotted on separate but proportional
axes. It is clear from the figure that although the “correct” marriage rate drops
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relatively more sharply than the crude marriage rate, the two measures exhibit ex-
tremely similar patterns. Therefore, the crude marriage rate can provide an accurate
indication of the evolution of the “correct” marriage rate.
The figure also shows that changes in the crude marriage rate understate
changes in the “correct” marriage rate. Indeed, the percentage change in the crude
marriage rate between 1989 and 1997 was smaller by an average factor of 1.19 than
the percentage change in the “correct” marriage rate. The difference between the
evolution of the two indicators is much smaller after the enactment of the two laws,
the average factor during the period 1998–2005 being 1.02. The crude marriage rate
is thus a better indicator of the “correct” marriage rate after the enactment of the
two laws.
The data available for Statistics Netherlands allows for a breakdown of mar-
riages into different-sex and same-sex marriages. In addition, it includes information
on new registered partnerships, again separately for same-sex and different-sex cou-
ples. This makes it possible to study in turn the evolution of three different indica-
tors: the different-sex marriage rate, the overall marriage rate, and the different-sex
union rate (marriages and registered partnerships), all defined as the corresponding
number of contracts per 1,000 individuals.
As in the individual-level analysis, the variables included in the vector of de-
terminants X can be classified in three groups. First, there are the variables that
describe the number of people at risk of marriage and the probability that they will
meet, or the thickness of the marriage market. This group includes the fraction of
the population in the 25–44 age group, the fraction of population living in urban
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areas, the ratio of women to men in the population, and the age at first marriage
of both men and women. The second set of variables describes the attractiveness
of individuals in the marriage market in terms of their current or potential earnings
and in terms of fertility. These variables are the labor force participation of both
men and women aged 25–34, the total fertility rate (the average number of children
that would be born by women of bearing age), and girls’ enrollment share in tertiary
education. Finally, the unemployment rate of individuals in the 25–34 age group
describes business cycle fluctuations.
The first two columns in table 3.1 list the mean of each variable for the Nether-
lands and for the potential donors as a group (unweighted average) for the period
between 1988 and 1997. The differences in the numbers range from very small (la-
bor force participation of men) to relatively large (unemployment), indicating that
there are some significant differences between the potential donors as a group and
the Netherlands. Therefore, the unweighted average of the potential donors might
not be an appropriate control group and the construction of a synthetic control is
required.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Crude marriage rate
The procedure described in section 3.2 produces three quantities of interest: a
diagonal matrix V ∗ of optimal loadings for each determinant variable X, a vector W ∗
of optimal weights for each potential donor, and the synthetic control constructed
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as a weighted average of marriage rates in the potential donors by applying the
optimal weights W ∗.
Recall that the matrix V includes loadings for both the determinant variables
X and the average marriage rate for the period before the intervention. In order
to assess the importance of each variable in X in the construction of the synthetic
control, column 4 in table 3.1 lists the loadings for the determinant variables in
X rescaled so as to sum to one. The table indicates that the variables with the
most predictive power are the fertility rate and inflation, followed by the age at first
marriage of women and the labor force participation rate of men between 25 and 34
years of age.
The means of the determinant variables for the synthetic control are listed in
column 3 of table 3.1. It is apparent that the differences between the Netherlands
(column 1) and the synthetic control are much smaller than the differences between
the Netherlands and the unweighted average of potential donors. Indeed, the largest
percentage difference between columns 1 and 3 is about half the largest difference
between column 1 and 2, supporting the idea that the synthetic control is a more
appropriate control group than the group of potential donors.
The weights assigned to each country in the synthetic control are listed in
column 1 of table 3.2. Note that the non-negativity restriction on the weights leads,
in general, to corner solutions: 10 of the 17 countries have zero weight. Of the seven
countries with non-zero weights, Switzerland has almost three times more weight
than any other country and together with Italy, Austria and New Zealand accounts
for more than 75 percent of the synthetic control. Finally, the mean squared error
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of the marriage rate in the synthetic control relative to the actual marriage rate in
the Netherlands is 0.18, or 3 percent of the average crude marriage rate of 5.84 over
the same period (before 1998).
Figure 3.2 plots the marriage rate in the Netherlands and the synthetic control.
The two lines are relatively close for the period 1988–1997, before the registered
partnership law was enacted, a reassuring finding since this is the period when
the treated and the control group have to be similar. Between 1998 and 2000,
when registered partnership was made available to both same-sex and different-sex
couples, the marriage rate in the Netherlands is slightly higher than in the synthetic
control, though still relatively close. However, the marriage rate in the Netherlands
falls rapidly after 2001 but it increases slightly in the synthetic control.
One relatively straightforward way to gauge the decline in the marriage rate
is to compare the largest gap between the actual marriage rate in the Netherlands
and the synthetic control in each of the three periods: before 1998, between 1998
and 2000, and after 2001. Column 1 in table 3.3 lists these numbers. Note that the
largest absolute difference between the marriage rate in the Netherlands and the
synthetic control after 2001 occurs in 2005 and is equal to 0.61, or approximately
13.8% of the crude marriage rate in 2005. In contrast, the largest relative difference
between the two measures during 1988–1997 is 0.28, or 4.8% of the average crude
marriage rate during this period, and between 1998 and 2000 it is 0.34, or 6.10% of
the average crude marriage rate during this period. This suggests that the decline
in the marriage rate after 2001 is rather significant, being at least twice as large
(relatively) than any difference between the synthetic control and the real marriage
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rate in the previous periods.
The aggregate analysis above suggests that the marriage rate did not decline
after the introduction of registered partnership, but it did after the legalization of
same-sex marriage. This pattern is exactly the same as the one found in section 2.4,
supporting the validity of the individual-level analysis. In particular, there is no
negative effect of the registered partnership law on the marriage rate, but there is
such an effect for the same-sex marriage law. This result is robust to the inclusion
of additional variables, such as the difference in life expectancy between women and
men or the growth rate of real GDP. I also find the same pattern if I include in the
vector X of determinants values post-1998 for variables which are not likely to be
affected by the two laws (e.g., the ratio of women to men or GDP growth).
3.4.2 Placebo test
Although the results using both methods are similar, there is still the concern
that the synthetic control method might not produce an appropriate control because,
for example, the set of determinants X is not well chosen. Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) and Abadie et al. (2007) suggest two ways to conduct placebo tests that would
confirm or reject the choice of determinant variables. The first type of placebo test
is to choose a period of analysis prior to the intervention and assign an artificial
“intervention year” during this period. The synthetic control constructed in this
way should not differ from the treated group either before or after the artificial
intervention. Unfortunately, there is not enough historical data on all the variables
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included in the analysis to conduct such a placebo test.
The second type of placebo test consists of choosing some of the countries
with the highest weight in the synthetic control and assume that they actually
experienced the same type of intervention at the same time as the treated group.
A synthetic control can be constructed for each of these experiments using the rest
of the donor countries. These synthetic controls should not be different from the
“treated” countries since there is no intervention.
I conduct this second type of placebo test to confirm the validity of the method.
I focus on Switzerland, the country with the largest weight in the synthetic control
for the Netherlands. I eliminate it from the pool of potential donors and I construct
a synthetic control for Switzerland in the same way as before, using the method
in section 3.2 and data for the period between 1988 and 1997. The weights of
each country in the synthetic Switzerland are listed in column 2 of table 3.2. As
before, only a few of the potential donors have non-zero weights and three countries
(Germany, Korea and Ireland) account for more than 86 percent of the synthetic
control. Figure 3.3 plots the marriage rate in Switzerland and the corresponding
synthetic control. Unlike the case of the Netherlands, the two lines are remarkably
similar for the whole period of analysis. This is reassuring, as there should have
been no effect of the placebo laws on the marriage rate in Switzerland.
As before, we can compare the largest absolute differences between the crude
marriage rate in Switzerland and its synthetic control for the three periods. The
corresponding numbers are listed in column 4 of table 3.3. Note that the synthetic
control for Switzerland is a relatively poorer match than the one for the Netherlands
68
during the period used for its construction: the absolute difference between 1988
and 1997 is 0.51 in Switzerland, or 8.03% of the average marriage rate during the
period. In contrast, the absolute difference in the Netherlands during the same
period is only 4.81% of the average marriage rate. However, the relative differences
for Switzerland get only smaller in the subsequent periods: 0.22 (4.05% of the mean)
during 1998–2000 and 0.32 (6.08% of the mean) after 2001.
In conclusion, the placebo test suggests that the synthetic control method
constructs an appropriate control group and that the conclusions in section 3.4.1
are valid.
3.4.3 Different-sex marriage and union rates
Recall that the end-of-marriage argument holds that the different-sex marriage
rate would fall after the legalization of same-sex marriage or even the introduction of
same-sex registered partnership. In the individual-level analysis, I could not separate
different-sex from same-sex marriages as there was no information on the gender of
the spouse. However, Statistics Netherlands provides aggregate data for each type
of marriage, allowing a separate analysis of different-sex marriage. Since the crude
marriage rate used above includes both different-sex and same-sex marriages after
2001, it is an overstatement of the (crude) different-sex marriage rate. Indeed, as it
can be seen in figure 3.4 (compared to figure 3.2), the fall in the marriage rate after
2001 is even greater if only different-sex marriages are considered.1 Column 2 in
1Note that the synthetic control is the same as before because the counterfactual is the same:
what the marriage rate would be in the Netherlands if the two laws were not enacted, i.e. if only
different-sex couples were allowed to marry.
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table 3.3 lists the largest absolute differences between the different-sex marriage rate
and the synthetic control for each period. The differences for the periods 1988–1997
and 1998–2000 are the same as in column 1, since the different-sex marriage rate is
just the crude marriage rate prior to 2001. The absolute difference in 2005 is 0.68,
15.62% of the marriage rate that year, larger than in column 1. In other words, the
decline in the different-sex marriage rate is even larger than suggested by the crude
marriage rate.
One aspect that was not taken into account until now is that different-sex
couples have access to an alternative institution after the introduction of registered
partnership. If registered partnership is perceived as a reasonable alternative to
marriage, then it is possible that some couples might choose it over marriage. In
a world where marriage and registered partnership are equivalent, we would expect
couples to select randomly into an institution and thus have approximately half of
them choosing marriage and half registered partnership. In practice, the legal differ-
ences between the two institutions, however minor, and the difference in traditional
values ensure the fact that the distribution of couples across institutions is not even.
Thus, one can make the argument that what matters is the total number of unions,
i.e. marriages and registered partnerships, rather than just marriages. Figure 3.5
plots this different-sex union rate in the Netherlands and the marriage rate from
the synthetic control. Again, the synthetic control is the same as above. Note also
that the different-sex union rate is the same as the different-sex marriage rate and
the overall marriage rate prior to 1998 since the institution available to couples was
different-sex marriage.
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As before, we can compare the differences between the different-sex union rate
and the synthetic control over the three periods. The numbers are shown in column
3 of table 3.3. While the difference before 1998 is the same as in the previous two
columns, it is higher between 1998 and 2000 at 0.44, or 7.67% of the mean union rate.
This is not surprising since the union rate is the marriage rate plus the registered
partnership rate and the marriage rate was already higher than the synthetic control
during this period. The difference becomes smaller after 2001, however, to 0.33
(6.98% of the union rate in 2005 or 6.55% of the average union rate over the period),
which is relatively smaller than both the corresponding differences in columns 1 and
2 and the difference between 1998 and 2000. Moreover, the difference is comparable
to the difference prior to the introduction of registered partnership, which suggests
that there is not much change in the total number of unions in recent years relative
to the baseline period (prior to the registered partnership law), but rather sorting
across the two institutions.
3.4.4 Additional evidence
These results are consistent with two explanations. One the one hand, there
might be a learning process: people learn over time about registered partnership and
start switching away from marriage. This seems to be suggested by the evolution of
the registered partnership rate described in figure 2.4. Under this scenario, the same-
sex marriage law could have no effect and the observed decline in the marriage rate is
simply due to couples choosing registered partnership over marriage. Alternatively,
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the legalization of same-sex marriage could have changed the value of marriage
relative to registered partnership. Recall that the only major difference between
the two institutions is in the traditional value of marriage. If same-sex marriage
reduces the traditional value of marriage, then it is possible that more people switch
to registered partnership. Under this scenario, the decline in the marriage rate is
directly due to the legalization of same-sex marriage and the registered partnership
law could have no negative effects.
As long as the different-sex union rate is not larger than the marriage rate
in the synthetic control after 2001, there has to be some sorting of couples out of
marriage and into registered partnership. The number of different-sex registered
partnerships almost quadruples between 1998 and 2005, but most of the increase
occurrs after 2001, which suggests that the legalization of same-sex marriage might
have accelerated the learning process, the sorting process, or both. It is impossible
to distinguish between the two alternatives with the data available. Fortunately,
some additional evidence is provided by an evaluation study of the two institutions
commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Justice in 2005. Although there is no historic
information included, the results of the survey presented in Boele-Woelki et al.
(2006) can help shed some light on these two scenarios.
First, there is clear evidence of learning as some of the couples interviewed
who were in registered partnership report finding out about the institution after its
introduction, usually from a notary.2 Second, 57 percent of the couples in registered
2The couples report being told about registered partnership by a notary they visited for drawing
up or renewing cohabitation agreements (privately-drawn contracts between cohabiting partners)
or for inheritance issues (Boele-Woelki et al., 2006).
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partnership acknowledge not having considered marriage as an option. If at least
some of these couples entered registered partnership after 2001 and if the number of
different-sex unions is the same as in the absence of registered partnership and same-
sex marriage, as suggested by figure 3.5, then some of the couples who would have
gotten married in the absence of the laws choose not to formalize their relationship
anymore. Since the trend in the marriage rate and in the registered partnership rate
accelerate after 2001 in different directions, this supports the idea that the same-sex
marriage law might have a negative effect on different-sex marriage.
In conclusion, there is suggestive evidence that confirms both scenarios. Over
time, different-sex couples become increasingly aware of registered partnership and
start choosing it over marriage, but some different-sex couples choose either regis-
tered partnership over marriage or no formal relationship at all after the enactment
of the same-sex marriage law.3
3.5 Conclusion
Similar to the analysis in chapter 2, the analysis in this chapter suggests that
the marriage rate increased slightly after the enactment of the registered partnership
law and then fell after the enactment of the same-sex marriage law. This pattern is
even stronger if only different-sex marriages are considered. However, once registered
3At this point, it would be useful to compare these patterns to a model of first formalization of a
relationship through either registered partnership or marriage, similar to the model in section 2.2.
However, Boele-Woelki et al. (2006) report that registered partnership seems to be the choice
for older couples. The average age at partnership registration among the couples surveyed was
over 38 years for different-sex couples and over 43 years for same-sex couples, compared to 33
and 41 years for married couples. Indeed, only 701 men and 647 women in my sample enter
registered partnership, compared to 20,670 and 19,865 marriages, and the results in section 2.4 are
qualitatively the same if age at first marriage is replaced by age at first registration.
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partnerships are included, the rate of different-sex unions is close to the rate in the
synthetic control.
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it provides re-
assuring evidence on the validity of the individual-level analysis in the previous
chapter. While neither method can bring in itself hard enough evidence to convince
the reader, together they provide a compelling story on the effect of the two laws
on the marriage rate.
Second, the aggregate data allows for a separate study of the overall (crude)
marriage rate, the different-sex marriage rate and the different-sex union rate. The
evolution of these different measures uncovers two interesting stories. First, the
introduction of an alternative institution for different-sex couples leads to an in-
creased different-sex union rate. Second, there is sorting across the two institutions
for different-sex couples after both laws.
Finally, additional data provided by the survey conducted by Boele-Woelki
et al. (2006) suggests that two forces combine to influence the evolution of the
marriage rate. On the one hand, some couples become more aware of the alternative
institution of registered partnership and choose it over marriage or cohabitation
agreements. On the other hand, some couples who would have gotten married in
the absence of the two laws choose not to get married any more. Thus, the evidence
suggests that the evolution of the marriage rate after 2001 could be attributed to
both the long-term effect of the registered partnership law, via learning, and to the
short-term effect of the same-sex marriage law.
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3.A Data sources and description
The variables used in this chapter are defined as follows:
• Crude marriage rate = the number of (new) marriages per 1,000 individuals;
• Fraction of the population in an age group = number of people in the age
group divided by total population;
• Urban population = fraction of the midyear population of areas defined as
urban in each country and reported to the United Nations in total population;
• Female-male ratio = ratio of the total female population to total male popu-
lation;
• Age at first marriage = the average or median age of individuals marrying for
the first time;
• Labor force participation, by sex = ratio of the labor force (the total number of
people employed plus unemployed) for each sex to the working age population
(older than 15) for each sex, expressed in percentages;
• Total fertility rate = number of children born to women aged 15–49;
• Girls’ enrollment share in tertiary education = the number of girls enrolled in
tertiary education, expressed as a percentage of the total number of students
in tertiary education;
• Unemployment rate of individuals in the 25–34 age group = number of unem-
ployed persons as a percentage of the labor force (the total number of people
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employed plus unemployed) in the age group.
• Inflation = annual change in the consumer price index using 2000 as the base
year (the value of the index is equal to 100 in 2000).




















































































1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Year
Crude different−sex marriage rate (marriages per 1,000 individuals)
"Correct" different−sex marriage rate (marriages per 1,000 unmarried individuals 18+ y.o.)
Notes: The crude marriage rate is measured on the left axis, while the “correct” marriage
rate is measured on the right axis. The two axes are proportional: a one percent change
in the crude marriage rate (on the left axis) is projected onto a one percent change in the
“correct” marriage rate on the right axis.
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United Kingdom 0 0.042
United States 0 0
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Table 3.3: Differences between marriage and union rates and synthetic control
Absolute difference between synthetic control and
Netherlands Switzerland
Crude Different-sex Different-sex Crude
marriage marriage union marriage
rate rate rate rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1988–1997
Max 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.51
% of mean during period 4.81 4.81 4.81 8.03
% of year when max occurred 4.54 4.54 4.54 7.29
1998–2000
Max 0.34 0.34 0.44 0.22
% of mean during period 6.10 6.10 7.67 4.05
% of year when max occurred 6.01 6.01 7.56 4.13
2001–2005
Max 0.61 0.68 0.33 0.32
% of mean during period 12.53 14.27 6.55 6.08
% of year when max occurred 13.78 15.62 6.98 5.95
2005 only
Max 0.61 0.68 0.33 0.16
% of value 13.78 15.62 6.98 2.92
Notes: “Max” is the largest absolute difference between the synthetic control and the corresponding
measure. “% of mean during period” refers to the ratio of the max defined above to the average
of the corresponding measure during the indicated period, expressed as a percentage. “% of year
when max occured” is the ratio of the max to the value of the corresponding variable during the
year when the largest absolute difference is observed, expressed as a percentage. For “2005 only”,
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